Fairness & Solvency Opinions

For this week's post, we republish a prior post on the subject of Fairness Opinions. It's proven to be one of the most popular posts on the blog. If you missed it the first time, we hope you find it informative and helpful.What Is a Fairness Opinion?A Fairness Opinion involves a comprehensive review of a transaction from a financial point of view and is typically provided by an independent financial advisor to the board of directors of the buyer or seller.  The financial advisor must look at pricing, terms, and consideration received in the context of the market for similar companies. The advisor then opines that the transaction is fair, from a financial point of view and from the perspective of the seller’s minority shareholders. In cases where the transaction is considered to be material for the acquiring company, a second Fairness Opinion from a separate financial advisor on behalf of the buyer may be pursued.Why Is a Fairness Opinion Important?Why is a Fairness Opinion important?  There are no specific guidelines as to when to obtain a Fairness Opinion, yet it is important to recognize that the board of directors is endeavoring to demonstrate that it is acting in the best interest of all the shareholders by seeking outside assurance that its actions are prudent.One answer to this question is that good intention(s) without proper diligence may still give rise to potential liability.  In its ruling in the landmark case Smith v. Van Gorkom, (Trans Union), (488 A. 2d Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court effectively made the issuance of Fairness Opinions de rigueur in M&A and other significant corporate transactions.  The backstory to this case is the Trans Union board approved an LBO that was engineered by the CEO without hiring a financial advisor to vet a transaction that was presented to them without any supporting materials.  Regardless of any specific factors that may have led the Trans Union board to approve the transaction without extensive review, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the board was grossly negligent in approving the offer despite acting in good faith.  Good intentions, but lack of proper diligence.The facts and circumstances of any particular transaction can lead reasonable (or unreasonable) parties to conclude that a number of perhaps preferable alternatives are present. A Fairness Opinion from a qualified financial advisor can minimize the risks of disagreement among shareholders and misunderstandings about a deal. They can also serve to limit the possibilities of litigation which could kill the deal. Perhaps just as important as being qualified, a Fairness Opinion may be further fortified if conducted by a financial advisor who is independent of the transaction.  In other words, a financial advisor hired solely to evaluate the transaction, as opposed to the banker who is paid a success fee in addition to receiving a fee for issuing a Fairness Opinion.When Should You Obtain a Fairness Opinion?While the following is not a complete list, consideration should be given to obtaining a Fairness Opinion if one or more of these situations are present:Competing bids have been received that are different in price or structure, leading to potential disagreements in the adequacy and/or interpretation of the terms being offered, and which offer may be “best.” Conversely, when there is only one bid for the company, and competing bids have not been solicited.The offer is hostile or unsolicited.Insiders or other affiliated parties are involved in the transaction, giving rise to potential or perceived conflicts of interest.There is concern that the shareholders fully understand that considerable efforts were expended to assure fairness to all parties.What Does a Fairness Opinion Cover?A Fairness Opinion involves a review of a transaction from a financial point of view that considers value (as a range concept) and the process the board followed in reaching a decision to consummate a transaction.  The financial advisor must look at pricing, terms, and consideration received in the context of the market.  The advisor then opines that the consideration to be received (sell-side) or paid (buy-side) is fair from a financial point of view of shareholders, especially minority shareholders in particular, provided the advisor’s analysis leads to such a conclusion.While the Fairness Opinion itself may be conveyed in a short document, most typically as a simple letter, the supporting work behind the Fairness Opinion letter is substantial.  This analysis may be provided and presented in a separate fairness memorandum or equivalent document.A well-developed Fairness Opinion will be based upon the following considerations that are expounded upon in the accompanying opinion memorandum:A review of the proposed transaction, including terms and price and the process the board followed to reach an agreement.The subject company’s capital table/structure.Financial performance and factors impacting earnings.Management’s current year budget and multi-year forecast.Valuation analysis that considers multiple methods that provide the basis to develop a range of value to compare with the proposed transaction price.The investment characteristics of the shares to be received (or issued), including the pro-forma impact on the buyer’s capital structure, regulatory capital ratios, earnings capacity, and the accretion/dilution to earnings per share, tangible book value per share, dividends per share, or other pertinent value metrics.Address the source of funds for the buyer.What Is Not Covered in a Fairness Opinion?It is important to note what a Fairness Opinion does not prescribe, including:The highest obtainable price.The advisability of the action the board is taking versus an alternative.Where a company’s shares may trade in the future.How shareholders should vote a proxy.The reasonableness of compensation that may be paid to executives as a result of the transaction. Due diligence work is crucial to the development of the Fairness Opinion because there is no bright-line test that consideration to be received or paid is fair or not.  The financial advisor must take steps to develop an opinion of the value of the selling company and the investment prospects of the buyer (when selling stock).ConclusionThe Professionals at Mercer Capital may not be able to predict the future, but we have four decades of experience in helping boards assess transactions as qualified and independent financial advisors.  Sometimes paths and fairness from a financial point of view seem clear; other times they do not.Please give us a call if we can assist your company in evaluating a transaction.

This is the eighth article in a series on buy-side considerations. In this series, we will cover buy-side topics from the perspective of middle-market companies looking to enter the acquisition market. If you wish to read the rest of the series, click here. Directors are periodically asked to make tough decisions about the strategic direction of a company. Major acquisitions are usually one of the toughest calls boards are required to make. A board’s fiduciary duty to shareholders is encapsulated by three mandates:Act in good faith;Duty of care (informed decision making); andDuty of loyalty (no self-dealing; conflicts disclosed). Directors are generally shielded from courts second guessing their decisions by the business judgment rule provided there is no breach of duty to shareholders. The presumption is that non-conflicted directors made an informed decision in good faith. As a result, the burden of proof that a transaction is not fair and/or there was a breach of duty resides with the plaintiffs. An independent fairness opinion helps demonstrate that the directors of an acquiring corporation are fulfilling their fiduciary duties of making an informed decision. Fairness opinions seek to answer the question whether the consideration to be paid (or received from a seller’s perspective) is fair to a company’s shareholders from a financial point of view. Occasionally, a board will request a broader opinion (e.g., the transaction is fair). A fairness opinion does not predict where the buyer’s shares may trade in the future. Nor does a fairness opinion approve or disapprove a board’s course of action. The opinion, backed by a rigorous valuation analysis and review of the process that led to the transaction, is just that: an opinion of fairness from a financial point of view.Delaware, the SEC and FairnessFairness opinions are not required under Delaware law or federal securities law, but they have become de rigueur in corporate M&A ever since the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in 1985 that directors of TransUnion were grossly negligent because they approved a merger without adequate inquiry and expert advice. The court did not specifically mandate the opinion be obtained but stated it would have helped the board carryout its duty of care had it obtained a fairness opinion regarding the firm’s value and the fairness of the proposal.The SEC has weighed in, too, in an oblique fashion via comments that were published in the Federal Register in 2007 (Vol. 72, No. 202, October 19, 2007) when FINRA proposed rule 2290 (now 5150) regarding disclosures and procedures for the issuance of fairness opinions by broker-dealers. The SEC noted that the opinions served a variety of purposes, including as indicia of the exercise of care by the board in a corporate control transaction and to supplement information available to shareholders through a proxy.Dow’s Sour PickleBuy-side fairness opinions have a unique place in corporate affairs because the corporate acquirer has to live with the transaction. What seems fair today but is deemed foul tomorrow, may create a liability for directors and executive officers. This can be especially true if the economy and/or industry conditions deteriorate after consummation of a transaction.For instance, The Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”), a subsidiary of Dow Inc. (NYSE: DOW), agreed to buy Rohm and Haas (“RH”) for $15.4 billion in cash on July 10, 2008. The $78 per share purchase price represented a 75% premium to RH’s prior day close. The ensuing global market rout and the failure of a planned joint venture with a Kuwait petrochemical company led Dow to seek to terminate the deal in January 2009 and to cut the dividend for the first time in the then 97 years the dividend had been paid.Ultimately, the parties settled litigation and Dow closed the acquisition on April 1, 2009 after obtaining an investment from Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A) and seller financing via the sale of preferred stock to RH’s two largest shareholders.Dow was well represented and obtained multiple fairness opinions from its advisors (Citigroup, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley). One can question how the advisors concluded a 75% one-day premium was fair to Dow’s shareholders (fairness is a mosaic and maybe RH’s shares were severely depressed in the 2008 bear market). Nonetheless, the affair illustrates how vulnerable Dow’s Board of Directors or any board would have been absent the fairness opinions.Fairness and ElonBefore Elon Musk reneged on his planned acquisition of Twitter, Inc. (NYSE: TWTR) on July 8, 2022, one of the most recent contentious corporate acquisitions was the 2016 acquisition of SolarCity Corporation by Tesla Inc. (NASDAQGS: TSLA). Plaintiffs sought up to $13 billion of damages, arguing that (a) the Tesla Board of Directors breached its duty of loyalty, (b) Musk was unjustly enriched (Musk owned ~22% of both companies and was Chairman of both); and (c) the acquisition constituted waste.Delaware Court of Chancery Judge Joseph Slights ruled in favor of Tesla on April 27, 2022. Slights noted courts are sometimes skeptical of fairness opinions; however, he was not skeptical of Evercore’s opinion, noting extensive diligence, the immediate alerting of the Tesla Board about SolarCity’s liquidity situation and the absence of prior work by Evercore for Tesla. Tesla Walks the Entirely FairLine with SolarCityDownload Presentation

Depository M&A activity in the U.S. has accelerated in 2021 from a very subdued pace in 2020 when uncertainty about the impact of COVID-19 and the policy responses to it weighed on bank stocks. At the time, investors were grappling with questions related to how high credit losses would be and how far would net interest margins decline. Since then, credit concerns have faded with only a nominal increase in losses for many banks. The margin outlook remains problematic because it appears unlikely the Fed will abandon its zero-interest rate policy (“ZIRP”) anytime soon.As of September 23, 2021, 157 bank and thrift acquisitions have been announced, which equates to 3.0% of the number of charters as of January 1. Assuming bank stocks are steady or trend higher, we expect 200 to 225 acquisitions this year, equivalent to about 4% of the industry and in-line with 3% to 5% of the industry that is acquired in a typical year. During 2020, only 117 acquisitions representing 2.2% of the industry were announced, less than half of the 272 deals (5.0%) announced in pre-covid 2019.To be clear, M&A activity follows the public market, as shown in Figure 1. When public market valuations improve, M&A activity and multiples have a propensity to increase as the valuation of the buyers’ shares trend higher. When bank stocks are depressed for whatever reason, acquisition activity usually falls, and multiples decline.Click here to expand the image aboveThe rebound in M&A activity this year did not occur in a vacuum. Year-to-date through September 23, 2021, the S&P Small Cap and Large Cap Bank Indices have risen 25% and 31% compared to 18% for the S&P 500. Over the past year, the bank indices are up 87% and 79% compared to 37% for the S&P 500.Excluding small transactions, the issuance of common shares by bank acquirers usually is the dominant form of consideration sellers receive. While buyers have some flexibility regarding the number of shares issued and the mix of stock and cash, buyers are limited in the amount of dilution in tangible book value they are willing to accept and require visibility in EPS accretion over the next several years to recapture the dilution.Because the number of shares will be relatively fixed, the value of a transaction and the multiples the seller hopes to realize is a function of the buyer’s valuation. High multiple stocks can be viewed as strong acquisition currencies for acquisitive companies because fewer shares are issued to achieve a targeted dollar value.However, high multiple stocks may represent an under-appreciated risk to sellers who receive the shares as consideration. Accepting the buyer’s stock raises a number of questions, most which fall into the genre of: what are the investment merits of the buyer’s shares? The answer may not be obvious even when the buyer’s shares are actively traded.Our experience is that some, if not most, members of a board weighing an acquisition proposal do not have the background to thoroughly evaluate the buyer’s shares. Even when financial advisors are involved, there still may not be a thorough vetting of the buyer’s shares because there is too much focus on “price” instead of, or in addition to “value.”A fairness opinion is more than a three or four page letter that opines as to the fairness from a financial point of a contemplated transaction; it should be backed by a robust analysis of all of the relevant factors considered in rendering the opinion, including an evaluation of the shares to be issued to the selling company’s shareholders. The intent is not to express an opinion about where the shares may trade in the future, but rather to evaluate the investment merits of the shares before and after a transaction is consummated.Key questions to ask about the buyer’s shares include the following:Liquidity of the Shares - What is the capacity to sell the shares issued in the merger? SEC registration and NASADQ and NYSE listings do not guarantee that large blocks can be liquidated efficiently. OTC traded shares should be scrutinized, especially if the acquirer is not an SEC registrant. Generally, the higher the institutional ownership, the better the liquidity. Also, liquidity may improve with an acquisition if the number of shares outstanding and shareholders increase sufficiently.Profitability and Revenue Trends - The analysis should consider the buyer’s historical growth and projected growth in revenues, pretax pre-provision operating income and net income as well as various profitability ratios before and after consideration of credit costs. The quality of earnings and a comparison of core vs. reported earnings over a multi-year period should be evaluated. This is particularly important because many banks’ earnings in 2020 and 2021 have been supported by mortgage banking and PPP fees.Pro Forma Impact - The analysis should consider the impact of a proposed transaction on the pro forma balance sheet, income statement and capital ratios in addition to dilution or accretion in earnings per share and tangible book value per share both from the seller’s and buyer’s perspective.Tangible BVPS Earn-Back - As noted, the projected earn-back period in tangible book value per share is an important consideration for the buyer. In the aftermath of the GFC, an acceptable earn back period was on the order of three to five years; today, two to three years may be the required earn-back period absent other compelling factors. Earn-back periods that are viewed as too long by market participants is one reason buyers’ shares can be heavily sold when a deal is announced that otherwise may be compelling.Dividends - In a yield starved world, dividend paying stocks have greater attraction than in past years. Sellers should not be overly swayed by the pick-up in dividends from swapping into the buyer’s shares; however, multiple studies have demonstrated that a sizable portion of an investor’s return comes from dividends over long periods of time. Sellers should examine the sustainability of current dividends and the prospect for increases (or decreases). Also, if the dividend yield is notably above the peer average, the seller should ask why? Is it payout related, or are the shares depressed?Capital and the Parent Capital Stack - Sellers should have a full understanding of the buyer’s pro-forma regulatory capital ratios both at the bank-level and on a consolidated basis (for large bank holding companies). Separately, parent company capital stacks often are overlooked because of the emphasis placed on capital ratios and the combined bank-parent financial statements. Sellers should have a complete understanding of a parent company’s capital structure and the amount of bank earnings that must be paid to the parent company for debt service and shareholder dividends.Loan Portfolio Concentrations - Sellers should understand concentrations in the buyer’s loan portfolio, outsized hold positions, and a review the source of historical and expected losses.Ability to Raise Cash to Close -What is the source of funds for the buyer to fund the cash portion of consideration? If the buyer has to go to market to issue equity and/or debt, what is the contingency plan if unfavorable market conditions preclude floating an issue?Consensus Analyst Estimates - If the buyer is publicly traded and has analyst coverage, consideration should be given to Street expectations vs. what the diligence process determines. If Street expectations are too high, then the shares may be vulnerable once investors reassess their earnings and growth expectations.Valuation - Like profitability, valuation of the buyer’s shares should be judged relative to its history and a peer group presently and relative to a peer group through time to examine how investors’ views of the shares may have evolved through market and profit cycles.Share Performance - Sellers should understand the source of the buyer’s shares performance over several multi-year holding periods. For example, if the shares have significantly outperformed an index over a given holding period, is it because earnings growth accelerated? Or, is it because the shares were depressed at the beginning of the measurement period? Likewise, underperformance may signal disappointing earnings, or it may reflect a starting point valuation that was unusually high.Strategic Position - Assuming an acquisition is material for the buyer, directors of the selling board should consider the strategic position of the buyer, asking such questions about the attractiveness of the pro forma company to other acquirers?Contingent Liabilities - Contingent liabilities are a standard item on the due diligence punch list for a buyer. Sellers should evaluate contingent liabilities too.The list does not encompass every question that should be asked as part of the fairness analysis, but it does illustrate that a liquid market for a buyer’s shares does not necessarily answer questions about value, growth potential and risk profile. The professionals at Mercer Capital have extensive experience in valuing and evaluating the shares (and debt) of financial and non-financial service companies garnered from over three decades of business. Give us a call to discuss your needs in confidence.

Going Private 2023 presentation by Mercer Capitals’, Jeff K. Davis, CFA, that provides an overview of issues surrounding a decision to take an SEC-registrant private.Pros and Cons of Going PrivateStructuring a TransactionValuation AnalysisFairness Considerations

Evaluating a Buyer’s Shares From the Seller’s PerspectiveM&A activity in North America (and globally) is rebounding in 2021 after falling to less than $2.0 trillion of deal value in 2020 for just the second time since 2015 according to PitchBook; however, deal activity has accelerated in 2021 and is expected to easily top 2020 assuming no major market disruption due to a confluence of multiple factors.Most acquirers whose shares are publicly traded have seen significant multiple expansion since September 2020;Debt financing is plentiful at record low yields;Private equity is active; and,Hundreds of SPACs have raised capital and are actively seeking acquisitions. The rally in equities, like low borrowing rates, has reduced the cost to finance acquisitions because the majority of stocks experienced multiple expansion rather than material growth in EPS. It is easier for a buyer to issue shares to finance an acquisition if the shares trade at rich valuation than issuing “cheap” shares. As of June 3, 2021, the S&P 500’s P/E based upon trailing earnings (as reported) was 44.9x compared to the long-term average since 1871 of 16x. Obviously trailing earnings were depressed by the impact of COVID-19 on 2020 earnings, but forward multiples are elevated, too. Based upon consensus estimates for 12 months ended March 31, 2022, the S&P 500 is trading for 21x earnings. High multiple stocks can be viewed as strong acquisition currencies for acquisitive companies because fewer shares have to be issued to achieve a targeted dollar value. As such, it is no surprise that the extended rally in equities has supported deal activity this year. However, high multiple stocks may represent an under-appreciated risk to sellers who receive the shares as consideration. Accepting the buyer’s stock raises a number of questions, most which fall into the genre of: what are the investment merits of the buyer’s shares? The answer may not be as obvious as it seems, even when the buyer’s shares are actively traded. Our experience is that some if not most members of a board weighing an acquisition proposal do not have the background to thoroughly evaluate the buyer’s shares. Even when financial advisors are involved there still may not be a thorough vetting of the buyer’s shares because there is too much focus on “price” instead of, or in addition to, “value.” A fairness opinion is more than a three or four page letter that opines as to the fairness from a financial point of a contemplated transaction; it should be backed by a robust analysis of all of the relevant factors considered in rendering the opinion, including an evaluation of the shares to be issued to the selling company’s shareholders. The intent is not to express an opinion about where the shares may trade in the future, but rather to evaluate the investment merits of the shares before and after a transaction is consummated. Key questions to ask about the buyer’s shares include the following:Liquidity of the Shares - What is the capacity to sell the shares issued in the merger? SEC registration and even NASADQ and NYSE listings do not guarantee that large blocks can be liquidated efficiently. Generally, the higher the institutional ownership, the better the liquidity. Also, liquidity may improve with an acquisition if the number of shares outstanding and shareholders increase sufficiently.Profitability and Revenue Trends - The analysis should consider the buyer’s historical growth and projected growth in revenues, operating earnings (usually EBITDA or EBITDA less capital expenditures) in addition to EPS. Issues to be vetted include customer concentrations, the source of growth, the source of any margin pressure and the like. The quality of earnings and a comparison of core vs. reported earnings over a multi-year period should be evaluated.Pro Forma Impact - The analysis should consider the impact of a proposed transaction on revenues, EBITDA, margins, EPS and capital structure. The per share accretion and dilution analysis of such metrics as earnings, EBITDA and dividends should consider both the buyer’s and seller’s perspectives.Dividends - In a yield starved world, dividend paying stocks have greater attraction than in past years. Sellers should not be overly swayed by the pick-up in dividends from swapping into the buyer’s shares; however, multiple studies have demonstrated that a sizable portion of an investor’s return comes from dividends over long periods of time. If the dividend yield is notably above the peer average, the seller should ask why? Is it payout related, or are the shares depressed? Worse would be if the market expected a dividend cut. These same questions should also be asked in the context of the prospects for further increases.Capital Structure - Does the acquirer operate with an appropriate capital structure given industry norms, cyclicality of the business and investment needs to sustain operations? Will the proposed acquisition result in an over-leveraged company, which in turn may lead to pressure on the buyer’s shares and/or a rating downgrade if the buyer has rated debt?Balance Sheet Flexibility - Related to the capital structure should be a detailed review of the buyer’s balance sheet that examines such areas as liquidity, access to bank credit, and the carrying value of assets such as deferred tax assets.Ability to Raise Cash to Close - What is the source of funds for the buyer to fund the cash portion of consideration? If the buyer has to go to market to issue equity and/or debt, what is the contingency plan if unfavorable market conditions preclude floating an issue?Consensus Analyst Estimates - If the buyer is publicly traded and has analyst coverage, consideration should be given to Street expectations vs. what the diligence process determines. If Street expectations are too high, then the shares may be vulnerable once investors reassess their earnings and growth expectations.Valuation - Like profitability, valuation of the buyer’s shares should be judged relative to its history and a peer group presently and relative to a peer group through time to examine how investors’ views of the shares may have evolved through market and profit cycles.Share Performance - Sellers should understand the source of the buyer’s shares performance over several multi-year holding periods. For example, if the shares have significantly outperformed an index over a given holding period, is it because earnings growth accelerated? Or, is it because the shares were depressed at the beginning of the measurement period? Likewise, underperformance may signal disappointing earnings, or it may reflect a starting point valuation that was unusually high.Strategic Position - Assuming an acquisition is material for the buyer, directors of the selling board should consider the strategic position of the buyer, asking such questions about the attractiveness of the pro forma company to other acquirers?Contingent Liabilities - Contingent liabilities are a standard item on the due diligence punch list for a buyer. Sellers should evaluate contingent liabilities too. The list does not encompass every question that should be asked as part of the fairness analysis, but it does illustrate that a liquid market for a buyer’s shares does not necessarily answer questions about value, growth potential and risk profile. We at Mercer Capital have extensive experience in valuing and evaluating the shares (and debt) of financial and non-financial service companies garnered from over three decades of business.

Last week we explained why RIA principals and board members should consider getting a Fairness Opinion; FAIR … The F-word in RIA M&A: Part I; When Do You Need A Fairness Opinion?.Under U.S. case law, the so-called “Business Judgment Rule” presumes directors will make informed decisions that reflect good faith, care, and loyalty. If any of these criteria are breached in a board-approved transaction, then the directors may be liable for economic damages.RIA boards hire valuation and advisory firms like ours to opine on the fairness of contemplated transactions in an effort to protect themselves from potential liability.In a challenged transaction, the “entire fairness standard” requires the court to examine whether the board dealt fairly with the firm and whether the transaction was conducted at a fair price to its shareholders. As a result, Fairness Opinions seek to answer two questions:Is a transaction fair, from a financial point of view, to the shareholders of the selling company?Is the price received by the Seller for the shares not less than “adequate consideration” (i.e. fair market value)? Process and value are at the core of the opinion. A Fairness Opinion is backed by a rigorous valuation analysis and review of the process that led to the transaction. Some of the issues that are considered include the following.ProcessProcess can always be tricky in a transaction. A review of fair dealing procedures when markets have increased should be sensitive to actions that may favor a particular shareholder or other party.Management ForecastsA thorough analysis of management’s projections is a key part of a fairness analysis. After all, shareholders are giving up these future cash flows in exchange for cash (or stock) consideration today. Investment managers’ revenue is a product of the market, which over the past year has withstood significant volatility. A baseline forecast developed in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic may be stale today. Boards may want to consider the implications of the V-shaped market recovery on their company’s expected financial performance and the follow-through implications for valuation.TimingDeals negotiated mid-COVID, when it was unclear whether the market was in a V-shaped or W-shaped recovery, may leave your shareholders feeling like money was left on the table. It is up to the board to decide what course of action to take, which is something a Fairness Opinion does not directly address. Nevertheless, fairness is evaluated as of the date of the opinion, such that the current market environment is a relevant consideration.Buyer’s SharesIf a transaction is structured as a share-for-share exchange, then an evaluation of the buyer’s shares in a transaction is an important part of a fairness analysis. The valuation assigned to the buyer’s shares should consider its profitability and market position historically and relative to peers. If the purchaser is a public company, it is imperative that all recent public financial disclosure documents be reviewed. It is also helpful to talk with analysts who routinely follow the purchasing company in the public markets.It is equally important to note what a Fairness Opinion does not prescribe, including:The highest obtainable price.The advisability of the action the board is taking versus an alternative.Where an RIA’s shares may trade in the future.The reasonableness of compensation that may be paid to executives as a result of the transaction. Due diligence work is crucial in the development of the Fairness Opinion because there are no rules of thumb or hard and fast rules that determine whether a transaction is fair. The financial advisor must take steps to develop an opinion of the value of the selling company and the investment prospects of the buyer (when selling stock). We believe it is prudent to visit the selling RIA (if feasible), conduct extensive reviews of documentation, and interview management (either in person or virtually). Fairness Opinions are often memorialized in the form of a Fairness Memorandum. A Fairness Memorandum examines the major factors of the Fairness Opinion in some detail and summarizes the considerations of each factor for discussion by the board of directors. In many cases, the advisors rendering the Fairness Opinion will participate in these discussions and answer questions addressed by the board.ConclusionMercer Capital’s comprehensive valuation experience with investment managers enables us to efficiently provide reliable, unbiased Fairness Opinions that provide assurance to stakeholders that transactions underway are fair and reasonable. We’re happy to answer any preliminary questions you have on Fairness Opinions and when it makes sense to get one.

Fair. It’s the first-four-letter word that most children learn, and it often leads to more arguments than other choice words. Although children eventually learn that life is not always fair, we spend a lot of time ensuring that major economic events are. Transactions are rarely straightforward, and as the pace of M&A activity in the investment management community continues to accelerate, more shareholders are scrutinizing both the pricing and terms of transactions. Over the next two posts, we will explain when you should consider getting a Fairness Opinion and what that involves.What Is a FAIR Transaction?Under U.S. case law, the concept of the “Business Judgment Rule” presumes directors will make informed decisions that reflect good faith, care, and loyalty to shareholders. If any of these three are not met, then the “entire fairness standard” requires that, in the absence of an arms-length deal, transactions must be conducted with fair dealings (process) and atfair prices.Directors are generally shielded from challenges to corporate actions the board approves under the Business Judgement Rule provided there is not a breach of one of the three duties. However, once any of the three duties is breached, the burden of proof shifts from the plaintiffs to the directors. If a Board obtains a Fairness Opinion in significant transactions, they are more likely to be protected from this liability.Questions of value and fair dealing are subject to scrutiny, even in bull markets. Rapidly improving markets may lead your shareholders to question whether the price accepted in the context of negotiating and opining on a transaction could have been better. Below, we outline some circumstances when you should consider getting a Fairness Opinion before closing a deal.9x EBITDA in a 15x EBITDA World Fantasy The prominence of headlines touting impressive deal multiples has led to some unrealistic shareholder expectations around valuation. Yes, average deal multiples have increased over the last decade, more prospective buyers for your RIA exist today than there were five years ago, and maybe an irrational buyer with capacity will stroke checks for double-digit multiples. But the increase in average valuation multiples is being driven by a myriad of factors that do not perfectly correlate with the valuations of small to mid-sized RIAs.Echelon Partners 2020 RIA M&A Deal Report noted that the number of $1B+ transactions has doubled over the last five years. Most of these acquisitions, and especially the ones that attract headlines, warrant these higher multiples due to their sheer scale, rarity, and strategic significance. Not every RIA has the scale, growth pattern, and risk profile to warrant top-tier pricing. And, ultimately, no two asset managers, wealth managers, IBDs, OCIOs, or independent trust companies are alike.Nevertheless, boards facing a mismatch between shareholder expectations and market realities are in a tough position justifying a transaction. The evaluation and negotiation process is tricky when markets continue to climb day after day. Yet, Fairness Opinions can be used as one element of a decision process to evaluate significant transactions.Would You Prefer $10M or $7M Today, and $2M Each Year for the Next 3 Years?Most acquisitions of investment managers involve some form of contingent consideration. When evaluating multiple offers that involve varying amounts of upfront cash; equity consideration; and earn-out payments, periods, and terms, a Fairness Opinion can help Boards evaluate the economic merits of the terms being offered.Unsolicited OffersMany RIAs receive unsolicited offers from their friends, competitors, or institutional consolidators. When there is only one bid for the company and competing bids have not been solicited, the fairness of the transaction can more easily be disputed. Not every sale is best conducted in an auction process, but the prospective buyer making an unsolicited offer knows that it is, at least for the moment, the only bidder. The objective of an unsolicited offer is to get the seller’s attention and cause them to start negotiations, often giving the bidder an exclusive right to negotiate for a fixed amount of time. As the head of our investment management group, Mercer Capital President, Matt Crow, explains, “An unsolicited offer may be a competitive bid, but it is not a bid made in a competitive market.”The Investment Management Community Is SmallAlthough there are over 13,500 SEC-registered investment advisors in the U.S., the investment management community within a given sector or geography is fairly close-knit. Many RIAs join forces or sell to other RIAs they have known for many years. This is part of the reason deals work. In a relationship-driven business, it is hard to merge with or sell to someone with whom you don’t have an existing relationship. But anytime insiders or related parties are involved in a transaction, a Fairness Opinion can serve as a confirmation to a company’s shareholders that improper acts of self-dealings have not occurred.ConclusionWe have extensive experience in valuing investment management companies engaged in transactions during bull, bear, and boring markets. Mercer Capital’s comprehensive valuation and transaction experience with investment managers enables us to provide unbiased fairness opinions that directors can rely on to assure their stakeholders that the decisions being made are fair and reasonable.

The Key QuestionAs 2020 progressed, a record number of oil & gas operators and related oil field service companies filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which provides for the reorganization of the firm as opposed to full liquidation (Chapter 7).  In addition, consolidation by way of merger and acquisition (“M&A”) activity occurred, albeit such activity was at a 10-year low in 2020. Regardless of whether a company files for Chapter 11, is party to an M&A transaction, or executes some other form of capital restructuring – such as new equity funding rounds or dividend recaps – one fundamental question takes center stage: Will the company remain solvent?The Four TestsAs noted in our overview of solvency opinions last November, leveraged transactions that occurred pre-COVID-19 will continue to be scrutinized, with many bankruptcy courts considering the issue of solvency retroactively.  Due to increased energy price volatility in the first and second quarter of 2020, many operational and dividend programs were suspended.As oil & gas prices have stabilized and appreciated over the past one to two quarters (in its April Short-Term-Energy Outlook report, EIA projects WTI and Brent to average $58.89 and $62.28 per barrel, respectively), a large number of oil & gas operators have significantly reduced their debt, and are considering or have resumed their operational plans and dividend programs, albeit perhaps not exactly as before their suspension.Emerging from the chaos of 2020 with lower leverage, leaner and more efficient operations, higher commodity prices, and the continued low interest rate environment, it is not unreasonable to think that oil & gas companies may consider increasing leverage again as operations continue to recover or expand and boards approve the return of capital to shareholders by way of resuming regular or even special dividends.Often, a board contemplating such actions will be required to obtain a solvency opinion at the direction of its lenders or corporate counsel to provide evidence that the board exercised its duty of care to make an informed decision should the decision later be challenged.A solvency opinion, typically performed by an independent financial advisor, addresses four questions:Does the fair value of the company’s assets exceed its liabilities after giving effect to the proposed action?Will the company be able to pay its debts (or refinance them) as they mature?Will the company be left with inadequate capital?Does the fair value of the company’s assets exceed its liabilities and capital surplus to fund the transaction?A solvency opinion addresses these questions using four primary tests:Test 1: The Balance Sheet Test – Does the fair value and present fair salable value of the Company’s total assets exceed the Company’s total liabilities, including all identified contingent liabilities? The balance sheet test takes the fair value of the subject firm on a total invested capital basis and subtracts its liabilities. Test 2: The Cash Flow Test – Will the Company be able to pay its liabilities, including any identified contingent liabilities, as they become due or mature? The cash flow test examines whether projected cash flows are sufficient for debt service.  This is typically analyzed along three general dimensions, including the determination of the company’s revolving credit facility to manage cash flow needs over the forecast, the possible violation of any applicable covenants, and the likely ability to refinance any remaining debt balances at their maturity. Test 3: The Capital Adequacy Test – Does the Company have unreasonably small capital with which to operate the business in which it is engaged, as management has indicated such businesses are now conducted and as management has indicated such businesses are proposed to be conducted following the transaction? The capital adequacy test is related to the cash flow test and examines a company’s ability to service its debt with sufficient margin after giving effect to the proposed transaction.  While there is no bright line test for defining “unreasonably small capital”, we typically evaluate this concept based upon pro forma and projected leverage multiples utilizing management’s projections as a baseline scenario and alternative downside scenarios to determine if there is “unreasonably small capital” under more stressed conditions. Test 4: The Capital Surplus Test – Does the fair value of the Company’s assets exceed the sum of (a) its total liabilities (including identified contingent liabilities) and (b) its capital (as calculated pursuant to Section 154 of the Delaware General Corporation Law) The capital surplus test replicates the valuation analysis prescribed under the balance sheet test, but includes the par value of the company’s stock (or entire consideration received for the stock if no par value is given), in the amount subtracted from the fair value of the company’s assets.Solvency Considerations within Oil & GasPerforming a solvency opinion requires careful consideration of numerous factors even when everything clearly appears to be more or less favorable in a proposed transaction that involves increasing leverage.  It may be opportune to pursue a dividend recap as debt is cheap and the company is already exhibiting strong growth in an industry potentially starting to recover.  A company may increase leverage despite already having sufficient cash on hand for a special distribution, but it wants to maintain flexibility to act on unexpected growth opportunities that may arise.  Perhaps the company’s trajectory is so great that even its downside case(s) would be a lofty goal of the next closest competitor.  Still, the independent financial advisor must maintain a critical eye, taking a medium- to long-term perspective with a skeptic lens, to determine that the company may reasonably remain solvent.Now, consider the oil & gas sector in 2020.  Under the assumption that additional debt is needed just to survive, never mind paying special dividends, many additional questions to approaching the company’s baseline forecast and downside scenarios arise:If the fair value of the company’s assets is already greatly diminished in the current down cycle, how much should you temper – if at all – the downside future scenario(s) when conducting the capital adequacy test? An appropriate stress test scenario for a company at the top or mid-point of the business cycle may look far different from an appropriate stress at the bottom of the cycle.How will the balance sheet test fare given the concurrent decrease in asset fair value and increase in liabilities? Even if the capital adequacy and balance sheet tests do not raise any red flags on their own, the cash flow test may reveal significant concerns.  Is there enough flexibility with the existing revolver to address cash flow needs over the forecast, or will it need to be increased?  Could the revolver even be increased, if needed?Can the company financially perform well enough over the next three to five years that future (likely) higher interest rates won’t be overly burdensome if the company must refinance maturing debts?And while due diligence and financial feasibility studies are expected to be performed beforehand, what covenant violations are likely to occur and when (in the context of the forecast scenario)? Will the new debt be “covenant-light” and relatively toothless, or will the company find itself that much more constrained when the fangs sink in and the situation is already likely to be dire? While conversations regarding these questions and their implications may likely expose sensitive topics, these discussions must be candid if the independent advisor is to develop a well-founded and defensible opinion on the prospects of solvency. Mercer Capital renders solvency opinions on behalf of private equity firms, independent committees, lenders and other stakeholders that are contemplating a transaction in which a significant amount of debt is assumed to fund shareholder dividends, an LBO, acquisition or other such transaction that materially levers the company’s capital structure.  For more information or if we can assist you, please contact us.

Next week, during the inaugural RIA Practice Management Insights conference, we will set aside some time to answer your questions about succession planning.  Roughly two-thirds of RIAs are still owned by their founders, and only a quarter of those have non-founding shareholders.  We won’t solve all the pieces to the succession planning puzzle in our session, but we’ll address succession planning strategies, and what works best under different circumstances.We’ll cover some of these in more detail next week, but here’s a preview of our thinking about various succession planning (and exit) options.Sale to a Strategic BuyerIn all likelihood, the strategic buyer is another RIA, but it could be any financial institution hoping to realize certain efficiencies after the deal.  They will typically pay top dollar for a controlling interest position with some form of earn-out designed to incentivize the selling owners to transition the business smoothly after closing.  This scenario sometimes makes the most economic sense, but it does not afford selling principals much control over what happens to their employees or to the company’s name.Sale to a Consolidator or Roll-up FirmThese acquirers typically offer some combination of initial and contingent consideration to join their network of advisory firms.  The deals are usually debt-financed and typically structured with cash and stock upfront and an earn-out based on prospective earnings or cash flow.  Consolidators and roll-up firms usually don’t acquire or pay as much as strategic buyers, but they often allow the seller more autonomy over future operations.  While there are currently only a handful of consolidators, their share of sector deal making has increased dramatically in recent years.Sale to a Financial Buyer This scenario typically involves a private equity firm paying all-cash for a controlling interest position.  PE firms will usually want the founder to stick around for a couple of years after the deal but expect him or her to exit the business before they flip it to a new owner.  Selling principals typically get more upfront from PE firms than consolidators but sacrifice most of their control and ownership at closing.Patient (or Permanent) CapitalMost permanent capital investors are family offices, or investment firms backed by insurance companies, that make minority investments in RIAs either as a common equity stake or revenue share.  They typically allow the sellers to retain their independence and usually don’t interfere much with future operations.  While this option is not always as financially lucrative as the ones above, it is often an ideal path for owners seeking short term liquidity and continued involvement in this business.Internal Transition to the Next Generation of Firm Leadership Another way to maintain independence is by transitioning ownership internally to key staff members.  This process often takes a lot of time and at least some seller-financing as it’s unlikely that the next generation is able or willing to assume 100% ownership in one transaction.  Bank and/or seller financing is often required, and the full transition can take 10-20 years depending on the size of the firm and interest transacted.  This option typically requires the most preparation and patience but allows the founding shareholders to handpick their successors and future leadership.Combo DealMany sellers choose a combination of these options to achieve their desired level of liquidity and control.  Founding shareholders have different needs and capabilities at different stages of their life, so a patient capital infusion, for instance, may make more sense before ultimately selling to a strategic or financial buyer.  Proper succession planning needs to be tailored, and all these options should be considered.If you’re a founding partner or selling principal, you have a lot of exit options, and it’s never too soon to start thinking about succession planning.  Let us know what questions you have at the conference next week.Only 1 WEEK until the RIA Practice Management Insights conference begins!Mercer Capital has organized a virtual conference for RIAs that is focused entirely on operational issues – from staffing to branding to technology to culture – issues that are as easy to ignore as they are vital to success. The RIA Practice Management Insights conference will be a two half-day, virtual conference held on March 3 and 4.Join us and speakers like Jim Grant, Peter Nesvold, Matt Sonnen, and Meg Carpenter, among others, at the RIA Practice Management Insights, a conference unlike any other in the industry.Have you registered yet?

Based on available public data from S&P Global’s Market Intelligence platform, there were 25 merger and acquisition announcements in 2020 related to oil and gas companies at the entity level (including natural gas midstream and utility companies).  These 25 announcements represented at least $16.2 billion in total deal value, notwithstanding three deals where the value was not publicly disclosed.  On a quarterly basis, there were eight announcements in Q1 2020, eight in Q2 and Q3 combined, and nine in Q4.While the trend in the quarterly announcements is not very surprising, one phrase, in particular, creeps up with increasing frequency when reviewing transaction details as 2020 progressed: “Fairness Opinion.”In Q1, only one of the eight transactions was reported to have had a Fairness Opinion conducted.  None of the two transactions announced in Q2 had Fairness Opinions, but two of the six announced deals in Q3 did.  As the Oil and Gas industry began to get somewhat comfortable again, Q4 finished out strong with nine announced deals. However, nearly half of them were accompanied by Fairness Opinions.  We examine this trend from a monthly perspective in the following chart: Irrespective of what industry or sector a company may operate in, a fundamental question arises as mergers and acquisitions persist and company boards and management teams survey their options when a proposed transaction is put on the table: is it fair to all direct stakeholders? What Is a Fairness Opinion?A Fairness Opinion involves a comprehensive review of a transaction from a financial point of view and is typically provided by an independent financial advisor to the board of directors of the buyer or seller.  The financial advisor must look at pricing, terms, and consideration received in the context of the market for similar companies.  The advisor then opines that the transaction is fair, from a financial point of view and from the perspective of the seller’s minority shareholders.  In cases where the transaction is considered to be material for the acquiring company, a second Fairness Opinion from a separate financial advisor on behalf of the buyer may be pursued.  On this point, we note that among the six deals announced in 2020 where a Fairness Opinion was conducted, only one of the six had Fairness Opinions conducted on behalf of both the buyer and the seller; the opinions performed for the other five deals were solely on behalf of the sellers in those transactions.Why Is a Fairness Opinion Important?Why is a Fairness Opinion important?  There are no specific guidelines as to when to obtain a Fairness Opinion, yet it is important to recognize that the board of directors is endeavoring to demonstrate that it is acting in the best interest of all the shareholders by seeking outside assurance that its actions are prudent.One answer to this question is that good intention(s) without proper diligence may still give rise to potential liability.  In its ruling in the landmark case Smith v. Van Gorkom, (Trans Union), (488 A. 2d Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court effectively made the issuance of Fairness Opinions de rigueur in M&A and other significant corporate transactions.  The backstory to this case is the Trans Union board approved an LBO that was engineered by the CEO without hiring a financial advisor to vet a transaction that was presented to them without any supporting materials.  Regardless of any specific factors that may have led the Trans Union board to approve the transaction without extensive review, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the board was grossly negligent in approving the offer despite acting in good faith.  Good intentions, but lack of proper diligence.The facts and circumstances of any particular transaction can lead reasonable (or unreasonable) parties to conclude that a number of perhaps preferable alternatives are present.  A Fairness Opinion from a qualified financial advisor can minimize the risks of disagreement among shareholders and misunderstandings about a deal.  They can also serve to limit the possibilities of litigation which could kill the deal.  Perhaps just as important as being qualified, a Fairness Opinion may be further fortified if conducted by a financial advisor who is independent of the transaction.  In other words, a financial advisor hired solely to evaluate the transaction, as opposed to the banker who is paid a success fee in addition to receiving a fee for issuing a Fairness Opinion.When Should You Obtain a Fairness Opinion?While the following is not a complete list, consideration should be given to obtaining a Fairness Opinion if one or more of these situations are present:Competing bids have been received that are different in price or structure, leading to potential disagreements in the adequacy and/or interpretation of the terms being offered, and which offer may be “best”; Conversely, when there is only one bid for the company, and competing bids have not been solicited.The offer is hostile or unsolicited.Insiders or other affiliated parties are involved in the transaction, giving rise to potential or perceived conflicts of interest.There is concern that the shareholders fully understand that considerable efforts were expended to assure fairness to all parties.What Does a Fairness Opinion Cover?A Fairness Opinion involves a review of a transaction from a financial point of view that considers value (as a range concept) and the process the board followed in reaching a decision to consummate a transaction.  The financial advisor must look at pricing, terms, and consideration received in the context of the market.  The advisor then opines that the consideration to be received (sell-side) or paid (buy-side) is fair from a financial point of view of shareholders, especially minority shareholders in particular, provided the advisor’s analysis leads to such a conclusion.While the Fairness Opinion itself may be conveyed in a short document, most typically as a simple letter, the supporting work behind the Fairness Opinion letter is substantial.  This analysis may be provided and presented in a separate fairness memorandum or equivalent document.A well-developed Fairness Opinion will be based upon the following considerations that are expounded upon in the accompanying opinion memorandum:A review of the proposed transaction, including terms and price and the process the board followed to reach an agreement.The subject company’s capital table/structure.Financial performance and factors impacting earnings.Management’s current year budget and multi-year forecast.Valuation analysis that considers multiple methods that provide the basis to develop a range of value to compare with the proposed transaction price.The investment characteristics of the shares to be received (or issued), including the pro-forma impact on the buyer’s capital structure, regulatory capital ratios, earnings capacity, and the accretion/dilution to earnings per share, tangible book value per share, dividends per share, or other pertinent value metrics.Address the source of funds for the buyer.What Is Not Covered in a Fairness Opinion?It is important to note what a Fairness Opinion does not prescribe, including:The highest obtainable price.The advisability of the action the board is taking versus an alternative.Where a company’s shares may trade in the future.How shareholders should vote a prox.yThe reasonableness of compensation that may be paid to executives as a result of the transaction. Due diligence work is crucial to the development of the Fairness Opinion because there is no bright-line test that consideration to be received or paid is fair or not.  The financial advisor must take steps to develop an opinion of the value of the selling company and the investment prospects of the buyer (when selling stock).ConclusionThe Professionals at Mercer Capital may not be able to predict the future, but we have nearly four decades of experience in helping boards assess transactions as qualified and independent financial advisors.  Sometimes paths and fairness from a financial point of view seem clear; other times they do not.Please give us a call if we can assist your company in evaluating a transaction.

It has been 34 years since the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case Smith v. Van Gorkom, (Trans Union), (488 A. 2d Del. 1985) and thereby made the issuance of fairness opinions de rigueur in M&A and other significant corporate transactions. The backstory of Trans Union is the board approved an LBO that was engineered by the CEO without hiring a financial advisor to vet a transaction that was presented to them without any supporting materials.Why would the board approve a transaction without extensive review? Perhaps there were multiple reasons, but bad advice and price probably were driving factors.  An attorney told the board they could be sued if they did not approve a transaction that provided a hefty premium ($55 per share vs a trading range in the high $30s).Although the Delaware Supreme Court found that the board acted in good faith, they had been grossly negligent in approving the offer. The Court expanded the concept of the Business Judgment Rule to include the duty of care in addition to the duties to act in good faith and loyalty.  The Trans Union board did not make an informed decision even though the takeover price was attractive. The process by which a board goes about reaching a decision can be just as important as the decision itself.Directors are generally shielded from challenges to corporate actions the board approves under the Business Judgement Rule provided there is not a breach of one of the three duties; however, once any of the three duties is breached the burden of proof shifts from the plaintiffs to the directors.  In Trans Union the Court suggested had the board obtained a fairness opinion it would have been protected from liability for breach of the duty of care.The suggestion was consequential.  Fairness opinions are now issued in significant corporate transactions for virtually all public companies and many private companies and banks with minority shareholders that are considering a take-over, material acquisition, or other significant transaction.When to Get a Fairness OpinionAlthough not as widely practiced, there has been a growing trend for fairness opinions to be issued by independent financial advisors who are hired to solely evaluate the transaction as opposed to the banker who is paid a success fee in addition to receiving a fee for issuing a fairness opinion.While the following is not a complete list, consideration should be given to obtaining a fairness opinion if one or more of these situations are present:There is only one offer for the bank and competing bids have not been solicitedCompeting bids have been received that are different in price and structure (e.g., cash vs stock)The shares to be received from the acquiring bank are not publicly traded and, therefore, the value ascribed to the shares is open to interpretationInsiders negotiated the transaction or are proposing to acquire the bankShareholders face dilution from additional capital that will be provided by insidersVarying offers are made to different classes of shareholdersThere is concern that the shareholders fully understand that considerable efforts were expended to assure fairness to all partiesWhat’s Included (and What’s Not) in a Fairness Opinion A fairness opinion involves a review of a transaction from a financial point of view that considers value (as a range concept) and the process the board followed. The financial advisor must look at pricing, terms, and consideration received in the context of the market for similar banks. The advisor then opines that the consideration to be received (sell-side) or paid (buy-side) is fair from a financial point of view of shareholders (particularly minority shareholders) provided the analysis leads to such a conclusion. The fairness opinion is a short document, typically a letter.  The supporting work behind the fairness opinion letter is substantial, however, and is presented in a separate fairness memorandum or equivalent document. A well-developed fairness opinion will be based upon the following considerations that are expounded upon in an analysis that accompanies the opinion:A review of the proposed transaction, including terms and price and the process the board followed to reach an agreementThe subject company’s capital table/structureFinancial performance and factors impacting earningsManagement’s current year budget and multi-year forecastValuation analysis that considers multiple methods that provide the basis to develop a range of value to compare with the proposed transaction priceThe investment characteristics of the shares to be received (or issued), including the pro-forma impact on the buyer’s capital structure, regulatory capital ratios, earnings capacity, accretion/dilution to EPS, TBVPS, DPSAddress the source of funds for the buyer and any risk funding may not be available It is important to note what a fairness opinion does not prescribe, including:What the highest obtainable price may beThe advisability of the action the board is taking versus an alternativeWhere a company’s shares may trade in the futureHow shareholders should vote a proxyThe reasonableness of compensation that may be paid to executives as a result of the transaction Due diligence work is crucial to the development of the fairness opinion because there is no bright line test that consideration to be received or paid is fair or not.  Mercer Capital has nearly four decades of experience in assessing bank (and non-bank) transactions and the issuance of fairness opinions.  Please call if we can assist your board. Originally appeared in Mercer Capital's Bank Watch, April 2019

Viewed from the prism of “fairness” in which a transaction is judged to be fair to shareholders from a financial point of view, many transactions are reasonable; some are very fair; and some are marginally fair. Transactions that are so lopsided in favor of one party should not occur absent a breach of corporate duties by directors (i.e., loyalty, care and good faith), bad advice, or other extenuating circumstances. Obtaining competent financial advice is one way a board exercises its duty of care in order to make an informed decision about a significant corporate transaction.The primary arbiter of fairness is the value of the consideration to be received or paid relative to indications of value derived from various valuation methodologies. However, the process followed by the board leading up to the transaction and other considerations, such as potential conflicts, are also important in the context of “entire” fairness.A tough fairness call can occur when a transaction price appears to be low relative to expectations based upon precedent transactions, recent trading history, management prognostications about a bright future, and/or when the value of the consideration to be received is subject to debate. The pending acquisition of commercial finance lender NewStar Financial, Inc. (“NewStar”; Nasdaq-NEWS) is an example where the acquisition price outwardly seems to be low, at least until other factors are considered.NewStar ExampleOn October 16, 2017, NewStar entered into a merger agreement with First Eagle Holdings, Inc. (“First Eagle”) and an asset purchase agreement with GSO Diamond Portfolio Holdco LLC (“GSO”). Under the merger agreement, NewStar will be acquired by First Eagle for (a) $11.44 per share cash; and (b) non-transferable contingent value rights (“CVR”) that are estimated to be worth about $1.00 per share if the transaction closes before year-end and $0.84 per share if the transaction closes in 2018. The CVR reflects the tax benefit associated with the sale of certain loans and investments at a discount to GSO for $2.37 billion.Also of note, the investment management affiliate of First Eagle is majority owned by an entity that is, in turn, partially owned by Corsair Capital LLC, which is the largest shareholder in NewStar with a 10.3% interest.Acquisition PriceAs shown in Figure 1, the acquisition price including all of the CVR equates to 83% of tangible book value (“TBV”), while the market premium is nominal. Although not relevant to the adequacy of the proposed pricing, NewStar went public in late 2006 at $17.00 per share then traded to around $20 per share in early 2007 before sliding to just about $1.00 per share in March 2009. “Feel” is a very subjective term; nonetheless the P/TBV multiple that is well below 100%, when combined with the nominal market premium, feels light. NewStar is not a troubled lender. Non-performing assets the past few years have been in the vicinity of 3% of loans, while net charge-offs have approximated 1% other than 2015 when losses were negligible. Further, the implied haircut applied to the loans and investments that will be acquired by GSO is modest.Transaction MultiplesWhile the P/TBV multiple for the transaction is modest, the P/E multiple is not at 26.5x (the latest twelve month (“LTM”) earnings) and 18.4x (the consensus 2018 estimate). The P/E could be described as full if NewStar were an average performing commercial bank and very full if it was a typical commercial finance company in which low teen P/Es are not unreasonable.What the P/TBV multiple versus the P/E multiple indirectly states is that NewStar has a low ROE, which has been less than 5% in recent years. The culprit is a highly competitive market for leveraged loans, a high cost of funds absent cheap bank deposit funding and perhaps excess capital. Nonetheless, management’s projections incorporated into the recently filed proxy statement project net income and ROE will double from $20 million/3% in the LTM period ended September 30 to $41 million/6% in 2020.In spite of a doubling of projected net income, the present value (assuming NewStar is worth 18.4x earnings in 2020 discounted to September 30 at a discount rate of 13%) is about $507 million, or about the same as the current transaction value to shareholders. Earnings forecasts are inherently uncertain, but one takeaway is that the P/TBV multiple does not appear so light in the context of the earnings forecast.Additional perspective on the transaction multiples is provided in Figure 2 in which NewStar’s P/TBV multiple based upon its public market price consistently has been below 100% the last several years while the P/E has been around 20x or higher due to weak earnings.Performance and TimingAs for the lack of premium there outwardly did not appear to be wide-spread expectation that a transaction was imminent (as was thought possible in 2013 when Bloomberg reported the company was shopping itself). There were no recent media reports; however, the shares fell by 17% between May 2–May 19 following a weak first quarter earnings report. The shares subsequently rebounded 19% between June 6–June 14. Both the down and then up moves were not accompanied by heavy volume. Trading during most of this time frame fell below the approximate 100 thousand daily average shares.Measured from June 14–October 17, the day after the announcement, NewStar’s shares rose about 10% compared to 8% for the SNL Specialty Finance Index. Measured from May 19, when the shares bottomed following the weak first quarter results the shares rose 34% compared to 12% for the index through October 17. The market premium relative to recent trading was negligible, but it is conceivable some premium was built into the shares for the possibility of a transaction given the sharp rebound during mid-June when negotiations were occurring.Other Support for the TransactionFurther support for the transaction can be found in the exhaustive process that led to the agreements as presented in the proxy statement. The proxy confirmed the Bloomberg story that the board moved to market the company in 2013. Although its investment bankers contacted 60 potential buyers, only two preliminary indications of value were received, in part because U.S. banking regulators tightened guidelines in 2013 related to leverage lending by commercial banks. The two indications were later withdrawn.During 2016 discussions were held with GSO regarding a going-private transaction, in addition to meetings with over 20 other parties to solicit their interest in a transaction. By the spring of 2017, consideration of a going-private transaction was terminated. Discussions then developed with First Eagle/GSO, Party A and Party B that eventually led to the announced transaction. Given the experience of trying to sell NewStar in 2013 and go private in 2016, the board elected not to broaden the marketing, calculating the most likely bidders would be alternative asset managers (vs. banks with a low cost of funding).Fairness considerations about the process were further strengthened through a “go-shop” provision in the merger agreement that provided for a 30-day “go-shop” period in which alternative offers could be solicited. If a superior offer emerged and the agreements with First Eagle and GSO were terminated a modest termination fee of $10 million (~2.5%) would be owed. Conversely, if NewStar terminates because GSO cannot close, then a $25 million termination fee will be owed to NewStar.The go-shop provision was activated, but to no avail. More than 50 parties were contacted and seven other unsolicited inquiries were received. NewStar entered into confidentiality agreements with 22 of the parties, but no acquisition proposals were received.Financial AdvisorsOther elements of the agreements that are notable for a fairness opinion include the use of two financial advisors, financing, and director Thornburgh, who was recused from the deliberations given his association with 10% shareholder Corsair, which holds, with Blackstone, a majority interest in First Eagle. Financing was not a condition to close on the part of the buyers because GSO secured $2.7 billion of debt and equity capital to finance the asset purchase. First Eagle will use excess funds from the asset purchase and existing available cash to fund the cash consideration to be paid at closing to NewStar shareholders. While two financial advisors cannot make an unfair deal fair, the use of two here perhaps gave the board additional insight that was needed given the four-year effort to sell, take the company private, or affect some other corporate action to increase value.The Lesson from the NewStar ExampleWhile the transaction price for NewStar seems low, there are other factors at play that bear consideration. When reviewing a transaction to determine if it is fair from a financial viewpoint, a financial advisor has to look at the entire transaction in context. Some shareholders will, of course, focus on one or two metrics to support a view that is counter to the board’s decision.ConclusionEvery transaction has its own nuances and raison d’etre whether the price “feels right” or not. Mercer Capital has significant experience helping boards sort through valuation, process and other issues to determine what is fair (or not) to shareholders from a financial point of view. Please call if we can help your board make an informed decision.Originally published in Mercer Capitals Portfolio Valuation: Private Equity Marks Newsletter: Fourth Quarter 2017

Sometimes deals can go horribly wrong between the signing of a merger agreement and closing. Buyers can fail to obtain financing that seemed assured; sellers can see their financial position materially deteriorate; and a host of other “bad” things can occur. Most of these lapses will be covered in the merger agreement through reps and warranties, conditions to close, and if necessary, the nuclear trigger that can be pushed if negotiations do not produce a resolution: the material adverse event clause (MAEC). And MAEC = litigation.Bank of America’s (BAC) 2008 acquisition of Countrywide Financial Corporation will probably be remembered as one of the worst transactions in U.S. history, given the losses and massive fines that were attributed to Countrywide. BAC management regretted the follow-on acquisition of Merrill Lynch so much that the government held CEO Ken Lewis’ feet to the fire when he threatened to trigger MAEC in late 2008 when large swaths of Merrill’s assets were subjected to draconian losses. BAC shareholders bore the losses and were diluted via vast amounts of common equity that were subsequently raised at very low prices.Another less well-known situation from the early crisis years is the acquisition of Charlotte-based Frist Charter Corporation (FCTR) by Fifth Third Bancorp (FITB). The transaction was announced on August 16, 2007 and consummated on June 6, 2008. The deal called for FITB to pay $1.1 billion for FCTR, consisting 30% of cash and 70% FITB shares with the exchange ratio to be set based upon the five day closing price for FITB the day before the effective date. At the time of the announcement FITB expected to issue ~20 million common shares; however, 45 million shares were issued because FITB shares fell from the high $30s immediately before the merger agreement was signed to the high teens when it was consummated. (The shares would fall to a closing low of $1.03 per share on February 20, 2009; the shares closed at $25.93 per share on July 14, 2017.) The additional shares were material because FITB then had about 535 million shares outstanding. Eagerness to get a deal in the Carolinas may have caused FITB and its advisors to agree to a fixed price / floating exchange ratio structure without any downside protection.A more recent example of a deal that may entail both buyer and seller regrets is Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce’s (CIBC) now closed acquisition of Chicago-based Private Bancorp Inc. (PVTB). A more detailed account of the history of the transaction can be found here. The gist of the transaction is that PVTB entered into an agreement to be acquired by CIBC on June 29, 2016 for 0.3657 CIBC shares that trade in Toronto (C$) and New York (US$), and $18.80 per share of cash. At announcement the transaction was valued at $3.7 billion, or $46.20 per share. As U.S. bank stocks rapidly appreciated after the November 8 national elections, institutional investors began to express dismay because Canadian stocks did not advance. In early December, proxy firms recommended shareholders vote against the deal. A mid-December shareholder vote was then postponed.CIBC subsequently upped the consideration two times. On March 31, 2017, it proposed to acquire PVTB for 0.4176 CIBC shares and $24.20 per share of cash. On May 4, CIBC further increased the cash consideration by $3.00 to $27.20 per share because its shares had trended lower since March as concerns intensified about the health of Canada’s housing market. On May 12, shareholders representing 66% of PVTB’s shares approved the acquisition. Figure 1 highlights the trouble with the deal from PVTB shareholders’ perspective. While the original deal entailed a modest premium, the performance of CIBC’s shares and the sizable cash consideration resulted in little change in the deal value based upon the original terms. On March 30 the deal equivalent price for PVTB was $50.10 per share, while the market price was $59.00 per share. The following day when PVTB upped the consideration the offer was valued at $60.11 per share; however, the revised offer would have been worth nearly $69 per share had CIBC’s shares tracked the SNL U.S. Bank Index since the agreement was announced on June 29. On May 11 immediately before the shareholder vote the additional $3.00 per share of cash offset the reduction in CIBC’s share price such that transaction was worth ~$60 per share, while the “yes-but” value was over $71 per share had CIBC’s shares tracked the U.S. index since late June. Fairness opinions do not cover regret, but there are some interesting issues raised when evaluating fairness from a financial point of view of both PVTB and CIBC shareholders. (Note: Goldman Sachs & Co. and Sandler O’Neill & Partners provided fairness opinions to PVTB as of June 29 and March 30. The registration statement does not disclose if J.P. Morgan Securities provided a fairness opinion as the lead financial advisor to CIBC. The value of the transaction on March 30 when the offer was upped the second time was $4.9 billion compared to CIBC’s then market cap of US$34 billion.)Fairness is a Relative ConceptSome transactions are not fair, some are reasonable, and others are very fair. The qualitative aspect of fairness is not expressed in the opinion itself, but the financial advisor conveys his or her view to management and a board that is considering a significant transaction. When the PVTB deal was announced on June 29, it equated to $46.35 per share, which represented premiums of 29% and 14% to the prior day close and 20-day average closing price. The price/tangible book value multiple was 220%, while the P/E based upon the then 2016 consensus estimate was 18.4x. As the world existed prior to November 8, the multiples appeared reasonable but not spectacular.Fairness Does not Consider 20-20 Hindsight VisionFairness opinions are qualified based upon prevailing economic conditions; forecasts provided by management and the like and are issued as of a specific date. The opinion is not explicitly forward looking, while merger agreements today rarely require an affirmation of the initial opinion immediately prior to closing as a condition to close. That is understandable in the context that the parties cut a deal that was deemed fair to shareholders from a financial point of view when signed. In the case of PVTB, the future operating environment (allegedly) changed with the outcome of the national election. Banks were seen as the industry that would benefit from a combination of lower corporate tax rates, less regulation, faster economic growth, and higher rates as part of the “reflation trade.” A reasonable deal became not so reasonable if not regrettable when the post November 8 narrative excluded Canadian banks. Time will tell if PVTB’s earning power really will improve, or whether the move in bank stocks was purely speculative.Subtle Issues Sometimes MatterAlthough not a major factor in the underperformance of CIBC’s shares vis-à-vis U.S. banks, the Canadian dollar weakened from about C$1.30 when the merger was announced on June 29 to C$1.33 in early December when the shareholder meeting was postponed. When shareholders voted to approve the deal on May 12 the Canadian dollar had eased further to C$1.37. The weakness occurred after the merger agreement was signed and the initial fairness opinions were delivered on June 29. Sometimes seemingly small financial issues can matter in the broad fairness mosaic, but only with the clarity of hindsight.Waiting for a Better Deal is not a Fairness ConsiderationAlthough a board will consider the business case for a transaction and strategic alternatives, a fairness opinion does not address these issues. The original registration statement noted that Private was not formally shopped. The deal was negotiated with CIBC exclusively, which twice upped its initial offer before the merger agreement was signed in June. It was noted that the likely potential acquirers of PVTB were unable to transact for various reasons. The turn of events raises an interesting look-back question: should the board have waited for a better competitive situation to develop? We will never know; however, the board is given the benefit of the doubt because it made an informed decision given what was then known.The Market Established a Fair PriceInstitutional shareholders had implicitly rejected what became an unfair deal by early December when PVTB’s shares traded well above the deal price. The market combined with the “no” recommendation of three proxy firms forced PVTB to delay the special meeting. The increase in the consideration in late March pushed the deal price to a slight premium to PVTB’s market price. CIBC increased the cash consideration an additional $3.00 per share in early May to offset a decline in CIBC’s shares that had occurred since the consideration was increased in March. The market had in effect established its view of a fair price. While CIBC could have declined to up its offer yet again, it chose to offset the decline.Relative Fairness from CIBC’s Perspective FluctuatedWhat appeared to be a reasonable deal from CIBC’s perspective in June became exceptionally fair by early December, if the market is correct that the earning power of U.S. commercial banks will materially improve as a result of the November 8 election. CIBC’s financial advisors can easily change assumptions in Excel spreadsheets to justify a higher price based upon better future earnings than originally projected, but would doing so be “fair” to CIBC shareholders whether expressed euphemistically or formally in a written opinion? So far the evidence of higher earning power is indirect via the market placing a higher multiple on current bank earnings in expectation of much better earnings that will not be observable until 2018 or 2019. That as a stand-alone proposition is an interesting valuation attribute to consider as part of a fairness analysis both from PVTB’s and CIBC’s perspective.ConclusionHindsight is easy; predicting the future is a fool’s errand. Fairness opinions do not opine where securities will trade in the future. Some PVTB shareholders may have regrets that CIBC was not a U.S. commercial bank whose shares would have out-performed CIBC’s after November 8. CIBC shareholders may regret the PVTB acquisition even though U.S. expansion has been a top priority. The key, as always in any M&A transaction, will be execution over the next several years rather than the PowerPoint presentation. Higher rates, a faster growing U.S. economy and the like will help, too, if they occur.We at Mercer Capital cannot predict the future, but we have over three decades of experience in helping boards assess transactions as financial advisors. Sometimes paths and fairness from a financial point of view seem clear; other times they do not. Please call if we can assist your company in evaluating a transaction.This article originally appeared in Mercer Capital's Bank Watch, July 2017.

When asked about his view of a tie years before the NCAA instituted the playoff format in the 1990s, Coach Bear Bryant famously described the outcome as “kissing your sister.” If he were a portfolio manager holding a position in a company that entered into a merger of equals (MOE), his response might be the same. Wall Street generally does not like MOEs unless the benefits are utterly obvious and/or one or both parties had no other path to create shareholder value. In some instances, MOEs may be an intermediate step to a larger transaction that unlocks value. National Commerce Financial Corporation CEO Tom Garrott once told me that part of his rationale for entering into a $1.6 billion MOE with CCB Financial Corp. in 2000 that resulted in CCB owning 47% of the company was because bankers told him he needed a bigger retail footprint to elicit top dollar in a sale. It worked. National Commerce agreed to be acquired by SunTrust Banks, Inc. in 2004 in a deal that was valued at $7 billion.Kissing Your Sister?MOEs, like acquisitions, typically look good in a PowerPoint presentation, but can be tough to execute. Busts from the past include Daimler-Benz/Chrysler Corporation and AOL/Time Warner. Among banks the 1994 combination of Cleveland-based Society Corporation and Albany-based KeyCorp was considered to be a struggle for several years, while the 1995 combination of North Carolina-based Southern National Corp. and BB&T Financial Corporation was deemed a success.The arbiter between success and failure for MOEs typically is culture, unless the combination was just a triumph of investment banking and hubris, as was the case with AOL/Time Warner. The post-merger KeyCorp struggled because Society was a centralized, commercial-lending powerhouse compared to the decentralized, retail-focused KeyCorp. Elements of both executive management teams stuck around. Southern National, which took the BB&T name, paid the then legacy BB&T management to go away. At the time there was outrage expressed among investors at the amount, but CEO John Allison noted it was necessary to ensure success with one management team in charge. Likewise, National Commerce’s Garrott as Executive Chairman retained the exclusive option to oust CCB’s Ernie Roessler, who became CEO of the combined company, at the cost of $10 million if he chose to do so. Garrett exercised the option and cut the check in mid-2003 three years after the MOE was consummated.Fairness Opinions for MOEsMOEs represent a different proposition for the financial advisor in terms of rendering advice to the Board. An MOE is not the same transaction as advising a would-be seller about how a take-out price will compare to other transactions or the company’s potential value based upon management’s projections. The same applies to advising a buyer regarding the pricing of a target. In an MOE (or quasi-MOE) both parties give up 40-50% ownership for future benefits with typically little premium if one or both are publicly traded. Plus there are the social issues to navigate.While much of an advisor’s role will be focused on providing analysis and advice to the Board leading up to a meaningful corporate decision, the fairness opinion issued by the advisor (and/or second advisor) has a narrow scope. Among other things a fairness opinion does not opine:The course of action the Board should take;The contemplated transaction represents the highest obtainable value;Where a security will trade in the future; andHow shareholders should vote. What is opined is the fairness of the transaction from a financial point of view of the company’s shareholders as of a specific date and subject to certain assumptions. If the opinion is a sell-side opinion, the advisor will opine as to the fairness of the consideration received. The buy-side opinion will opine as to the fairness of the consideration paid. A fairness opinion for each respective party to an MOE will opine as to the fairness of the exchange ratio because MOEs largely entail stock-for-stock structures. Explaining the benefits of an MOE and why ultimately the transaction is deemed to be fair in the absence of a market premium can be challenging. The pending MOE among Talmer Bancorp Inc. (45%) and Chemical Financial Corp. (55%) is an example. When the merger was announced on January 26, the implied value for Talmer was $15.64 per share based upon the exchange ratio for Chemical shares (plus a small amount of cash). Talmer’s shares closed on January 25, 2016 at $16.00 per share. During the call to discuss the transaction, one analyst described the deal as a “take under” while a large institutional investor said he was “incredibly disappointed” and accused the Board of not upholding its fiduciary duty. The shares dropped 5% on the day of the announcement to close at $15.19 per share. Was the transaction unfair and did the Board breach its fiduciary duties (care, loyalty and good faith) as the institutional shareholder claimed? It appears not. The S-4 notes Talmer had exploratory discussions with other institutions, including one that was “substantially larger”; yet none were willing to move forward. As a result an MOE with Chemical was crafted, which includes projected EPS accretion of 19% for Talmer, 8% for Chemical, and a 100%+ increase in the cash dividend to Talmer shareholders. Although the fairness opinions did not opine where Chemical’s shares will trade in the future, the bankers’ analyses noted sizable upside if the company achieves various peer-level P/Es. (As of mid-July 2016, Talmer’s shares were trading around $20 per share.) Fairness is not defined legally. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “fair” as “just, equitable and agreeing with what is thought to be right or acceptable.” Fairness when judging a corporate transaction is a range concept. Some transactions are not fair, some are in the range—reasonable, and others are very fair. The concept of “fairness” is especially well-suited for MOEs. MOEs represent a combination of two companies in which both shareholders will benefit from expense savings, revenue synergies and sometimes qualitative attributes. Value is an element of the fairness analysis, but the relative analysis takes on more importance based upon a comparison of contributions of revenues, earnings, capital and the like compared to pro forma ownership.Investment Merits to ConsiderA key question to ask as part of the fairness analysis: are shareholders better off or at least no worse for exchanging their shares for shares in the new company and accepting the execution risks? In order to answer the question, the investment merits of the pro forma company have to be weighed relative to each partner’s attributes.Profitability and Revenue Trends. The analysis should consider each party’s historical and projected revenues, margins, operating earnings, dividends and other financial metrics. Issues to be vetted include customer concentrations, the source of growth, the source of any margin pressure and the like. The quality of earnings and a comparison of core vs. reported earnings over a multi-year period should be evaluated.Expense Savings. How much and when are the savings expected to be realized. Do the savings come disproportionately from one party? Are the execution risks high? How does the present value of the after-tax expense savings compare to the pre-merger value of the two companies on a combined basis?Pro Forma Projected Performance. How do the pro forma projections compare with each party’s stand-alone projections? Does one party sacrifice growth or margins by partnering with a slower growing and/or lower margin company?Per Share Accretion. Both parties of an MOE face ownership dilution. What is obtained in return in terms of accretion (or dilution) in EBITDA per share (for non-banks), tangible BVPS, EPS, dividends and the like?Distribution Capacity. One of the benefits of a more profitable company should be (all else equal) the capacity to return a greater percentage of earnings (or cash flow) to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks.Capital Structure. Does the pro forma company operate with an appropriate capital structure given industry norms, cyclicality of the business and investment needs to sustain operations? Is there an issue if one party to an MOE is less levered and the other is highly levered?Balance Sheet Flexibility. Related to the capital structure should be a detailed review of the pro forma company’s balance sheet that examines such areas as liquidity, funding sources, and the carrying value of assets such as deferred tax assets.Consensus Analyst Estimates. This can be a big consideration in terms of Street reaction to an MOE for public companies. If pro forma EPS estimates for both parties comfortably exceed Street estimates, then the chances for a favorable reaction to an MOE announcement improve. If accretion is deemed to be marginal for the risk assumed or the projections are not viewed as credible, then reaction may be negative.Valuation. The valuation of the combined company based upon pro forma per share metrics should be compared with each company’s current and historical valuations and a relevant peer group. Also, while no opinion is expressed about where the pro forma company’s shares will trade in the future, the historical valuation metrics provide a context to analyze a range of shareholder returns if earning targets are met under various valuation scenarios. This is particularly useful when comparing the analysis with each company on a stand-alone basis.Share Performance. Both parties should understand the source of their shares and the other party’s share performance over multi-year holding periods. For example, if the shares have significantly outperformed an index over a given holding period, is it because earnings growth accelerated? Or, is it because the shares were depressed at the beginning of the measurement period? Likewise, underperformance may signal disappointing earnings, or it may reflect a starting point valuation that was unusually high.Liquidity of the Shares. How much is liquidity expected to improve because of the MOE? What is the capacity to sell shares issued in the merger? SEC registration and even NASADQ and NYSE listings do not guarantee that large blocks can be liquidated efficiently.Strategic Position. Does the pro forma company have greater strategic value as an acquisition candidate (or an acquirer) than the merger partners individually?ConclusionThe list does not encompass every question that should be asked as part of the fairness analysis for an MOE, but it points to the importance of vetting the combined company’s investment attributes as part of addressing what shareholders stand to gain relative to what is relinquished. We at Mercer Capital have over 30 years of experience helping companies and financial institutions assess significant transactions, including MOEs. Do not hesitate to contact us to discuss a transaction or valuation issue in confidence.

August has become the new October for markets in terms of increased volatility and downward pressure on equities and high yield credit. This year has seen similar volatility as was the case in some memorable years such as 1998 (Russian default; LTCM implosion), 2007 (tremors in credit markets), 2008 (earthquakes in credit and equity markets) and 2011 (European debt crisis; S&P’s downgrade of the U.S.). Declining commodity markets, exchange rate volatility and a pronounced widening of credit spreads finally began to reverberate in global equity markets this year.So far the downdraft in equities and widening high yield credit spreads has not slowed M&A activity. Preliminary data from Thomson Reuters for the third quarter indicates global M&A exceeded $1 trillion, which represents the third highest quarter on record and an increase of 11% over the year ago quarter. Activity is less broad-based though as 8,989 deals were announced compared to 10,614 a year ago.Immediately prior to intensified pressure on risk-assets, Thomson Reuters estimated that as of August 13 global M&A was on pace for a record year with $2.9 trillion of announced transactions globally (+40% vs. LYTD) and $1.4 trillion in the U.S. (+62%). Within the U.S., strategic buyer activity rose 53% to $1.1 trillion while PE M&A rose 101% to $326 billion.LBO multiples have been trending higher since 2009. The median LBO EBITDA multiple for broadly syndicated large deals was 10.1x through September, while middle market multiples expanded to 10.3x. Debt to EBITDA multiples for LBOs were 6.0x for large deals YTD and 5.5x for middle market transactions.No one knows what the future holds for markets. Deal activity could slow somewhat; however, a weak environment for organic revenue growth will keep many strategic buyers engaged, while lower prices for sellers if sustained will make more targets affordable for private equity provided debt financing costs do not rise too much. As of October 14, the option-adjusted-spread (OAS) on Bank of America Merrill Lynch’s High Yield Index was 6.31%, up from 5.04% at year-end and 4.83% a year ago.The role of the financial advisor becomes tougher too when markets are declining sharply. Obviously, sellers who do not have to sell may prefer to wait to see how market turmoil will play out while buyers may push to strike at a lower valuation. Questions of value and even fair dealing may be subjected to more scrutiny.Fairness opinions seek to answer the question whether a proposed transaction is fair to a company’s shareholders from a financial point of view. Process and especially value are at the core of the opinion. A fairness opinion does not predict where a security—e.g. an acquirer’s shares—may trade in the future. Nor does a fairness opinion approve or disapprove a board’s course of action. The opinion, backed by a rigorous valuation analysis and review of the process that led to the transaction, is just that: an opinion of fairness from a financial point of view. Nevertheless, declining markets in the context of negotiating and opining on a transaction will raise the question: How do current market conditions impact fairness?There is no short answer; however, the advisor’s role of reviewing the process, valuation, facts and circumstances of the transaction in a declining market should provide the board with confidence about its decision and the merits of the opinion. Some of the issues that may weigh on the decision process and the rendering of a fairness opinion in a falling market include the following:Process vs. Timing. Process can always be tricky in a transaction. A review of fair dealing procedures when markets have fallen sharply should be sensitive to actions that may favor a particular shareholder or other party. A management-led LBO after the market has fallen or a board that agrees to buyback a significant shareholder’s interest when prices were higher are examples. Even an auction of a company may be subject to second guessing if the auction occurred in a weak environment.Corporate Forecasts. Like the market, no one knows how the economy will perform over the next several years; however, consideration should be given to whether declining equity markets and widening credit spreads point to a coming economic slowdown. A baseline forecast that projects rising sales and earnings or even stable trends may be suspect if the target’s sales and earnings typically fall when the economy enters recession. A board should consider the implications of any sustained economic slowdown on the subject’s expected financial performance with follow-through implications for valuation.Valuation. Unless markets experience a sharp drop from a valuation level that reflects a widely held view that multiples were excessive, a sharp pullback in the market will cause uncertainty about what’s “fair” in terms of value. DCF valuations and guideline M&A transaction data may derive indications that are above what is obtainable in the current market. Transactions that were negotiated in mid-2007 and closed during 2008 may have felt wildly generous to the seller as conditions deteriorated. Likewise, deals negotiated in mid-2012 that closed in 2013 when markets were appreciating may have felt like sellers left money on the table. There is no right or wrong, only the perspective provided from the market’s “bloodless verdict” of obtaining a robust market check if a company or significant asset is being sold. It is up to the board to decide what course of action to take, which is something a fairness opinion does not address.Exchange Ratios. Acquisitions structured as share exchanges can be especially challenging when markets are falling. Sellers will tend to focus on a fixed price, while buyers will want to limit the number of shares to be issued. The exchange ratio can be (a) fixed when the agreement is signed; (b) fixed immediately prior to closing (usually based upon a 10 day volume-weighted average price of the buyer); or (c) a hybrid such as when the ratio floats based upon an agreed upon value for the seller provided the buyer’s shares remain within a specified band. Floating exchange ratios can be seen as straightjackets for buyers and lifejackets for sellers in falling markets; rising markets entail opposite viewpoints.Buyer’s Shares. An evaluation of the buyer’s shares in transactions that are structured as a share exchange is an important part of the fairness analysis. Like profitability, valuation of the buyer’s shares should be judged relative to its history and a peer group presently and relative to a peer group through time to examine how investors’ views of the shares may have evolved through market and profit cycles. The historical perspective can then be compared with the current down market to make inferences about relative performance and valuation that is or is not consistent with comparable periods from the past.Financing. If consummation of a transaction is dependent upon the buyer raising cash via selling shares or issuing debt, a sharp drop in the market may limit financing availability. If so, the board and the financial advisor will want to make sure the buyer has back-up financing lined-up from a bank. The absence of back-stop financing, no matter how remote, is an out-of-no-where potential that a board and an advisor should think through. Down markets make the highly unlikely possible if capital market conditions deteriorate unabated. While markets periodically become unhinged, a board entering into an agreement without a backstop plan may open itself to ill-informed deal making if events go awry. A market saw states that bull markets take the escalator up and bear markets take the elevator down. Maybe the August sell-off will be the pause that refreshes, leading to new highs, tighter credit spreads, and more M&A. Maybe the October rebound in equities (but not credit, so far) will fade and the downtrend will resume. It is unknowable. What is known is that boards that rely upon fairness opinions as one element of a decision process to evaluate a significant transaction are taking a step to create a safe harbor. Under U.S. case law, the concept of the "business judgment rule" presumes directors will make informed decisions that reflect good faith, care and loyalty to shareholders. The evaluation process is trickier when markets have or are falling sharply, but it is not unmanageable. We at Mercer Capital have extensive experience in valuing and evaluating the shares (and debt) of financial and non-financial service companies engaged in transactions during bull, bear and sideways markets garnered from over three decades of business.

A fairness opinion provides an independent objective analysis of the financial aspects of a proposed transaction from the point of view of one or more of the parties to the transaction.They are often used to protect the interests of company directors, stockholders, investors and involved parties with any kind of fiduciary responsibility. While fairness opinions can not only help avoid disagreements among the individual stakeholders or between stakeholders and the Board, a fairness opinion is often necessary for a Board to have fulfilled their fiduciary duties.Mercer Capital leverages its historical valuation and investment banking experience to help clients navigate a critical transaction, providing timely, accurate and reliable results. We have significant experience advising boards of directors, management, trustees, and other fiduciaries of middle-market public and private companies in a wide range of industries. Our independent advice withstands scrutiny from shareholders, bondholders, the SEC, IRS, and other interested parties to a transaction, and we are well-versed in the new industry standards regarding fairness opinions issued by FINRA in late 2007.A variety of factors in transactions involving both public and private companies can trigger the necessity for a fairness opinion, including:Merger or sale of the companySale of subsidiary businesses, or distinct lines of businessRecapitalizationsStock repurchase programsSqueeze-out transactionsSpinoffs, spinouts, or split-upsCertain ESOP-related transactionsOther significant corporate events When performing a fairness opinion, it is also important to take into account any number of alternatives that may exist to the proposed transaction. As a valuation services firm, Mercer Capital is particularly well-equipped to provide the analysis for a deal in which a consideration other than cash if offered – namely, when the consideration is an interest in a closely held company. Mercer Capital's comprehensive valuation and transaction experience with public and private capital companies empowers us to efficiently provide unbiased fairness opinions that can rely on to assure stakeholders that the decisions being made are fair and reasonable. Contact a Mercer Capital professional to discuss your needs in confidence.