Transaction Advisory, Financial Services

January 2, 2020

2020 Outlook: Good Fundamentals, Moderate Valuations but Limited EPS Growth

Bank fundamentals, which are discussed in more detail below, did not change a lot between 2018 and 2019; however, bank stock prices and the broader market posted strong gains as shown in Table 1 following a short but intense bear market that bottomed on Christmas Eve 2018. Our expectation is that 2020 will not see much change in fundamentals either, while bank stocks will require multiples to expand to produce meaningful gains given our outlook for flattish earnings.

Fed Drives the Market Rebound

The primary culprit for the 4Q18 plunge and subsequent 2019 rebound in equity prices was the Fed, which has a propensity to hike until something breaks according to a long standing market saw. A year-ago the Fed had implemented its ninth hike in short-term policy rates that it controls despite the vocal protests of the President and, more importantly, the credit markets as reflected in widening credit spreads and falling yields on Treasury bonds and forward LIBOR rates.

One can debate how much weight the Fed places on equity markets, but it has always appeared to us that they pay close attention to credit market conditions. When the high yield bond and leverage loan markets shutdown in December 2018, the Fed was forced to pivot in January and back away from rate hikes after forecasting several for 2019 just a few months earlier. Eventually, the Fed was forced to reduce short rates three times and resume expansion of its balance sheet in the fourth quarter after halting the reduction (“quantitative tightening”) in mid-year.

Markets lead fundamentals. Among industry groups bank stocks are “early cyclicals,” meaning they turn down before the broader economy does and tend to turn up before other sectors when recessions bottom. One take from the price action in banks is that the economy in 2020 will be good enough that credit costs will not rise dramatically. Otherwise, banks would not have staged as strong a rebound as occurred.

Likewise, somewhat tighter spreads on B- and BB-rated high yield bonds relative to U.S. Treasuries (option adjusted spread, “OAS”) since the Fed eased is another data point that credit in 2020 will not see material weakening. The stable-to-tighter spreads in the high yield market today can be contrasted with 2007 when OAS began to widen sharply even after the Fed began to cut rates and the U.S. Treasury curve steepened as measured by the spread between the yield on the two-year and 10-year notes.

Bank Fundamentals

Bank fundamentals are in good shape even though industry net income for the first three quarters of 2019 increased nominally to $181 billion from $178 billion in the comparable period in 2018. On a quarterly basis, third quarter earnings of $57 billion were below the prior ($63 billion) and year ago ($62 billion) quarters. Not surprisingly, earnings pressure emerged during the year as what had been expanding NIMs during 2017 and 2018 began to contract due the emergence of a flat-to-inverted yield curve, a reduction in 30/90-day LIBOR which serves as a base rate for many loans, and continuation of a highly competitive market for deposits. Also, loan growth slowed in 2019—especially for larger institutions.

As shown in Table 2, core metrics such as asset quality and capital are in good shape, while profitability remains high. Our outlook for 2020 is for profitability to ease slightly due to incrementally higher credit costs and a lower full year NIM although stabilization seems likely during 2H20. Nonetheless, ROCE in the vicinity of 10- 11% and ROTCE of 13-14% for large community and regional banks seems a reasonable expectation.

EPS growth will be lacking, however. Wall Street consensus EPS estimates project essentially no change for large community and regional banks, while super regional banks are projected to be slightly higher at 3%. Money center banks (BAC, C, GS, JPM, MS, and WFC) reflect about 6% EPS growth, which seems high to us even though the largest banks tend to be more active in repurchasing shares relative to smaller institutions where excess capital is allocated to acquisitions, too.

The Fed—Presumably on Hold

In the December 2018 issue of Bank Watch we opined it was hard to envision the Fed continuing to raise short-term rates even though the Fed forecasted further hikes. We further cited the potential for rate cuts. Our reason for saying so was derived from the market rather than economists because intermediate- and long-term rates had decidedly broken an uptrend and were heading lower.

As the calendar turns to 2020, the Fed has indicated no changes are likely for the time being. The market reflects a modest probability that one more cut will be forthcoming, but to do so in an election year probably would require long rates to fall enough to meaningfully invert the Treasury curve unlike the nominal inversion which occurred in mid-2019.

As it relates to bank fundamentals, the impact on NIMs will depend upon individual bank balance sheet compositions. Broadly, however, a scenario of no rate hikes implies NIMs should stabilize in 2H20 as higher cost CDs and wholesale borrowings rollover at lower rates. Also, if the Fed continues to expand its balance sheet (presently it is doing so through only purchasing T-bills through support of the repo market) then assets may remain well bid. All else equal, stable to rising prices in the capital markets usually are supportive of credit quality within the banking system.

Bank Valuations—Rebound from Year-End 2018 “Bargains”

A synopsis of bank valuations is presented in Table 3 in which current valuations for the market cap indices are compared to year-end 2018 and year-end 2017 as well as multi-year medians based upon daily observations over the past 20 years.

The table illustrates the important concept of reversion to the mean. Valuations were above average as of year-end 2017 due to policy changes that occurred with the November 2016 national elections that culminated with the enactment of corporate tax reform in late 2017. One year later valuations were “cheap” as a result of the then bear market that reflected concerns the Fed would hike the U.S. into a recession. Despite the rebound in prices and valuation multiples during 2019, bank stocks enter 2020 with moderate valuations provided the market (and us) have not miscalculated and earnings are poised to fall sharply. Money center and super-regional banks are trading for median multiples of about 10x and 11x consensus 2020 earnings. Regional and large community banks, which include many acquisitive banks, trade for respective median multiples of 12x and 13x. An important point is that valuation is not a catalyst to move a stock; rather, valuation provides a margin of safety (or lack thereof) and thereby can provide additional return over-time as a catalyst such as upward (or downward) earnings revisions can cause a multiple to expand or contract. Looking back to last year one might surmise the rebound in valuations reflects the market’s view that the Fed avoided hiking the U.S. into recession.

Bank M&A—2020 Potentially a Great year

M&A activity has been robust with bank and thrift acquisitions since 2014 exceeding 4% of the industry charters at the beginning of each year. It appears once the final tally is made, upwards of 275 institutions will have been acquired in 2019, which would represent almost 5% of the industry. With only a handful of new charters granted since the financial crisis the industry is shrinking fast. As of Sept. 30, there were 5,256 U.S. banks and thrifts, down from about 18,000 in 1985.

While activity was steady at a high level in 2019, the most notable development was market support for four merger-of-equals (“MOE”) in which the transaction value exceeded $1.0 billion. The largest transaction closed Dec. 9 when BB&T Corp. and SunTrust merged to form Truist Financial Corp. Others announced this year include tie-ups between TCF Financial Corp./Chemical Financial Corp., First Horizon National Corp./IBERIABANK Corp., and Texas Capital Bancshares Inc./Independent Bank Group Inc. Although not often pursued, we believe MOEs are a logical transaction that if well executed provide significant benefits to community bank shareholders.

The national average price/tangible book multiple eased to 157% from 173% in 2018, while the median price/earnings (trailing 12 months as reported) declined to 16.8x from 25.4x (~21x adjusted for the impact of corporate tax reform). The reduction was not surprising given low public market valuations that existed at the beginning of 2019 because acquisition multiples track public market multiples with a lag.

We see 2020 shaping up as a potentially great year for bank M&A. The backdrop is an M&A trifecta: buyer and seller earnings will likely be flattish primarily due to sluggish loan growth and lower NIMs; asset quality is stable; and stock prices are higher, meaning buyers can offer better prices (but less value) to would-be sellers. Also, the capital markets remain wide open for banks to issue subordinated debt and preferred equity at very low rates to fund cash consideration not covered by existing excess capital.

Summing it Up

This year appears to be the opposite of late 2018 in which a strong market for bank stocks is predicting continuation of solid fundamentals and possibly better than expected earnings. Nonetheless, an environment in which earnings growth is expected to be modest at best likely will result in limited gains in bank stocks given the rebound in valuations that occurred in 2019.


Originally published in Bank Watch, December 2019.

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April 2026 | The Community Bank Scale Tax: Three Questions for Boards in 2026
Bank Watch: April 2026

The Community Bank Scale Tax: Three Questions for Boards in 2026

Community banks came into 2026 in better shape than many expected. Margins and earnings improved, deposits were growing again, loan growth held up, and unrealized losses on securities moved lower. On the surface, the story looks better than a year ago. But that does not mean the pressure is gone.For many community banks, the next big issue is not only rates or loan growth. It is whether the bank is big enough, focused enough, and efficient enough to carry the higher cost of being a modern bank. That cost includes more than salaries and branches. It also includes technology, cybersecurity, vendor management, fraud tools, compliance, and the people needed to run it well. The FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile shows that despite better net interest margins, the largest drag on earnings is the cost of running a modern bank.That is where many board conversations should be headed now. The challenge is simple to describe: banking keeps getting more expensive, the cost base is harder to flex, and smaller banks do not always have enough scale to spread those costs out. This does not mean every bank needs to sell but it does mean every bank needs to be honest about what it costs to stay independent.1. Which costs are truly fixed, and which ones are self-inflicted?Every bank has unavoidable costs for non-revenue generating activities, such as for risk management, compliance, and cybersecurity. But not every cost deserves the same treatment.Some banks are carrying real fixed costs. Others are carrying years of built-up complexity: too many vendors, too many products, too many exceptions, too many legacy processes, and too many branches doing less work than they used to.The distinction between real fixed costs and the just-as-real complexity costs matters. If management treats every expense as untouchable, the bank usually ends up protecting complexity instead of protecting value. Boards should push on that point. Which costs are now part of the price of doing business? And which costs are there because nobody has made the harder cleanup decisions? Those are two very different problems.2. Are we big enough, or focused enough, to make the model work?Scale matters in banking, which is not a new point. The part that often gets missed is that scale does not always have to come from simply getting bigger. Scale can come from size. It can also come from focus.A bank with a strong niche, an efficient branch footprint, a manageable product set, and good expense discipline can often perform better than a larger bank carrying too much overhead. Bigger is not always better if the added size comes with added complexity.That is an important point for community bank boards. The question is not just, “Do we need to grow?” The better question is, “Do we have a business model that can carry the cost structure we have today?” If the answer is no, the bank has a few options: it can grow, it can simplify, it can narrow its focus, it can outsource more of what does not set it apart, or it can decide that another partner may be better positioned to carry the platform going forward.Recent examples show the range of choices. Community Bank used a branch purchase from Santander to build scale in a target market; Five Star Bank’s parent chose to wind down BaaS and refocus on its core franchise; Mechanics Bank exited indirect auto and later outsourced servicing of the run-off portfolio; and Susquehanna chose to partner with C&N for greater scale, resiliency, and efficiency. In sum, there are plenty of proven options and choices.But doing nothing is also a choice. And in many cases, it is the most expensive one.3. How much does the expense base hurt shareholder value?This is where strategy turns into valuation. A bank is not credited just for spending money on technology, compliance, or infrastructure. It gets credited when those investments lead to better performance, better returns, better customer retention, better growth, and better risk control.If the bank carries a heavy cost base without a clear payoff, that usually shows up in weaker earnings and lower returns. Over time, it can also show up in a lower valuation, which matters even if the board has no near-term interest in selling. Valuation is not just about a sale; it is a scorecard on the strength of the franchise. A bank with strong returns and a clear strategy usually has more flexibility. A bank with weaker returns and too much complexity usually has fewer options.Timing matters. Banks have more breathing room now than they did a few years ago when interest rates increased sharply, with strong earnings and clean asset quality, and that is a good time to revisit strategic and technological plans.The issue in 2026 is not simply whether a community bank can remain independent. The issue is whether it can earn that independence after paying the ever-growing cost of being a modern bank.The banks that will stand out are not necessarily the biggest banks. They are the ones that know what they do well, run a cleaner model, and make sure their cost base supports the franchise instead of weighing it down. For some institutions, that will support long-term independence. For others, it may lead to a different conclusion.Either way, the discussion should start with a hard look at the expense base. In a lot of cases, the pressure to sell does not begin with a buyer showing up. It begins when the math stops working.About Mercer CapitalMercer Capital is a nationally recognized valuation and advisory firm serving financial institutions including banks, credit unions, fintech companies, insurance companies, investment management firms, financial sponsors, and other specialty finance firms. Mercer Capital regularly assists these clients with significant corporate valuation requirements, transactional advisory services, and other strategic decisions.
March 2026 | Capital Allocation: The Strategic Decision in a Slower Growth Environment
Bank Watch: March 2026

Capital Allocation: The Strategic Decision in a Slower Growth Environment

Following several years of balance sheet volatility and margin pressure, the operating environment for banks improved in 2025 as most posted higher earnings on expanded net interest margins. The outlook for 2026, at least prior to the outbreak of the U.S./Israel-Iran war, reflects(ed) a relatively stable operating environment.Stability, however, introduces a different challenge. Loan growth has moderated across much of the industry, and the benefit from asset repricing has largely been realized. In this environment, earnings growth is less dependent on external tailwinds and more dependent on internal discipline. As a result, capital allocation has moved to the center of strategic decision-making.The Expanding Capital Allocation ToolkitCapital allocation discussions are often framed around dividends and, to a lesser extent, share repurchases. In practice, the range of capital deployment decisions is broader and more interconnected. Banks today are balancing:Organic balance sheet growthTechnology and infrastructure investmentDividendsShare repurchasesM&ABalance sheet repositioningRetained capital for flexibilityEach alternative carries different implications for risk, return, and long-term franchise value.Organic growth often is the preferred use for internally generated capital when the risk-adjusted returns exceed the cost of equity. However, competitive loan pricing and a tough environment to grow low cost deposits have narrowed spreads, reducing the margin for error. Similarly, technology investments may improve efficiency over time but require upfront capital with uncertain timing of returns.Returns, Valuation, and Market DisciplinePublic market valuations provide a useful lens for evaluating capital allocation decisions. As shown in Figure 1(on the next page), banks that generate higher returns on tangible common equity (ROTCE) tend to command higher price-to-tangible book value multiples. This can also be expressed algebraically, at least on paper, whereby P/E x ROTCE = P/TBV, while P/Es reflect investor assessments about growth and risk.This relationship reflects a straightforward principle: capital should be deployed where it earns returns in excess of the cost of equity. When internal opportunities meet that threshold, reinvestment should be appropriate. When returns are below the threshold, returning capital to shareholders through special dividends or repurchases may create greater per-share value.Share repurchases, in particular, can be an effective tool when executed below intrinsic value and when capital levels remain sufficient to support strategic flexibility. However, repurchases that do not improve per-share metrics or are offset by dilution from other sources may have limited impact.Figure 1: Publicly Traded Banks with Assets $1 to $5 BillionBalance Sheet Repositioning as Capital AllocationIn some cases, capital allocation decisions are embedded within the balance sheet itself. One example is securities portfolio repositioning.Many banks continue to hold securities originated during the low-rate environment of 2020 and 2021. While unrealized losses associated with these portfolios have moderated, the yield on these assets often remains well below current market rates.Repositioning the portfolio, by realizing losses and reinvesting at higher yields, represents a tradeoff between near-term capital impact and longer-term earnings improvement. In effect, this decision can be evaluated similarly to other capital deployment alternatives, with management weighing the upfront reduction in Tier 1 Capital against the expected lift to net interest income and returns over time.As with M&A, the concept of an “earnback period” can be applied. Institutions that approach repositioning with a clear understanding of the payback dynamics are better positioned to evaluate whether the strategy enhances long-term shareholder value. We offer the caveat that institutions who evaluate restructuring transactions should compare the expected return from realizing losses (i.e., reducing regulatory capital) with instead holding the securities and repurchasing shares. If the bank’s shares are sufficiently cheap, then it could make sense to continue to hold the underwater bonds until the shares rise sufficiently.M&A and Capital FlexibilityM&A remains a viable capital deployment option, particularly for institutions seeking scale or improved operating efficiency. However, transaction activity continues to be constrained by pricing discipline, tangible book value dilution, and investor expectations around earnback periods.Public market valuations ultimately serve as a governor on deal pricing, reinforcing the importance of aligning capital deployment decisions with shareholder return expectations.Conclusion: Discipline Drives OutcomesIn a slower growth environment, capital allocation is not a secondary consideration; it is a core driver of performance. While banks cannot control market multiples, they can control how capital is deployed across competing opportunities.Institutions that consistently allocate capital with a clear focus on risk-adjusted returns, strategic alignment, and per-share value creation are more likely to generate sustainable growth in earnings and tangible book value. In the current environment, disciplined execution may prove more valuable than more aggressive but less certain alternatives.
The Tariff Hangover: How a Year of Trade Volatility Is Reshaping Transportation
The Tariff Hangover: How a Year of Trade Volatility Is Reshaping Transportation
The past year has been defined by a series of rapid and often unpredictable shifts in trade policy. New tariffs, temporary pauses, retaliatory measures, and evolving global supply chains have left a measurable impact on the transportation and logistics industry. These developments have influenced freight volumes, pricing dynamics, capital allocation, and ultimately the valuation of transportation companies.

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